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FIRST DAY

FIRST SECTIO'!\T

VIRGiilI.:\ SOARD OF BA.R BXA~IIi'.!::RS
Richnond, Virginia - February 24, 1976

1.
San Jones operated a far:i in Surry County, Virginia, with
substantial acreage planted in tobacco. ·:1e had obtained fire insurance coverage for ~is buildings and equipment from the Walter West
Insurance Agenc:l in Suffolk, dealing· ;Ji th Dob Smith, an officer and
employee of the agency. On October 1, 197!J, Jones received notice
from i.1is fire insurance carrier that his -:::>olicv would be cancelled
as of October l~, 1975. Jones i:nraediately called Smith who told him
not to worry, that he woulJ. obtain coverage for him, as it was simply
a matter of changinq carriers. Jones relied on this statement and
made no further effort to obtain coverage.
On December 2, 1975, a fire broke out in one of Jones'
tobacco ~tJarehouses, causing damages estimated at $15, 000. Jones
called Smith to find out ho~,.,,. he should file claim under his fire in-·
surance policy. Jones then learned that Srni th l1ad neglected to obtain fire insurance coverage to replace the cancelled policy.

Jones then filed an action in the Circuit Court of the City
of Suffolk against Smith and the Walter \·'lest Insurance Agency, alleging that ao a direct and proximate result of negligence and breach
of contract in failing to obtain a replacement insurance ~olicy,
Jones sustained a loss of $15,000. The defendants demurred on the
ground that there was a nisjoinder of actions. The Court sustained
the de1.mrrer and required Jones to elect between contract and tort.
Jones elected. to proceed in tort and an order was accordingly entered.
The case was then continued generally.
•rhe next day, Jones filed an action in contract against
the same defendants in the same Court. The Walter West Insurance
Agency filed grounds of defense and Smith filed a demurrer. Jones
then entered a non-suit in the contract action against Smith and proceeded in that action to obtain a judgment against the Walter West
Insurance Agency. The judgment ~V'as docketed but not paic1.
l\.fter judgment had been entered against the Walter West
Insurance A~ency in the contract action, Smith filed a special plea
in the tort action seeking its dismissal on the ground that Jones had
made a binding election an<l could no longer proceed against Smith.
Eow si1oul<l the Court rule on
by Smith?

t~e

special plea filed

'·i!i!I
1

'1111111!1'
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2.
Tom Short filed a motion for judgment against Fred Stout
in the Circuit Court of the City of :.Jorfolk seeking a judgment in
ejectment evicting Stout fror;t certain real estate situate in the
City of Norfolk on the grounds that Stout was operating a business
on the property in breach of deed covenants restricting the use of
the property to residential purposes. The covenants provided that
upon such a breach the granter or his assigns could recover possession of the property.
Stout demurred on the ground that the motion for judgment
failed to specify those acts which constituteci a breach of the cov-enant. The Court overruled the demurrer, but required Short, within lS days, to file a bill of particulars specifically stating the
acts which were relied upon to constitute a breach of the covenant.
Short filed his hill of particulars within the required time. Thereupon Stout filed his grounds of defense, denying that he had committed the acts alleged by Short, denying that he had in any way
breached the covenants, and denying that Short was entitled to recover possession of the lando Stout also filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that Short's pleadings, even as amplified
by the bill of particulars did not state a case for evicting Stout
from the premises.
How should the Court rule on the motion for summary
judgment when it is brought on for hearing?
3o
John Roy and Fred Quill were indicted jointly for the
commission of a felony. They elected to be tried together but the
Corrnnonwealth moved for oeparate trials. The Court set the motion
for argument and after carefully considering argument of counsel
for prosecution and the defense, ordered separate trials. At his
trial, Roy was speedily acquitted, but the Quill trial ran over
for three days. At the conclusion of each day in the Quill trial,
the Court admonished the jurors not to discuss the case with anyone and return the next morning. At the end of the trial, Quill
was convicted and sentenced. He appealed the conviction, assigning as error (1) the separation of the trials at the request of
the Commonwealth and (2) the failure of the trial court to keep
the jury together each night of the trial.
How should the Supreme Court rule on each assignment?
4.
Sam and Saul Able operated the Able Brothers Insurance
Agency, a partnership with offices at 2150 Connecticut Avenue,
Washington, D. Co Sam lived in Fairfax County, Virginia and
Saul lived in Chevy Chase, Maryland. Each was well established and had no thought of living elsewhere. The Able Brothers Agency filed suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia against Delco Corporation, a--Delaware Corporation with its principal office at 1700 K Street,
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Nashington, D.C. seeking damages in the amount of $17v000 due on a
promissory note. Delco Corporation filed a motion to dismiss on the
around that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the '3Ui t.
Hm•1

should the Court rule on the motion?

5.
Joe Tazewell entered into a contract with Therapeutic
Massage Chair Cornoany~ Inc. by the terms of which Tazewell was engaged to sell theraneutic massage chairs manufactured by the Company.
The contract provided, in substance~ Orders should be taken on
printed forms furnished by the Comnany;credit sales should be subject
to aporoval by the Companvr the sales Price stated in the printed
form could not be varied; -Tazewell ~,11ould sell no other chairs; Tazewell would receive as his cornmiGsion ten per cent (10%) of the
purchase nrice of each chair sold; the Comnany would, from time to
time.make suggestions respecting the methods of handling and promoting sales, but Tazewell could accept or reject such suggestions as
he wishes; Tazewell could conduct the business and devote such time
thereto as he deemed advisable; Tazewell would promptly remit to the
Company all money received by Tazewell on the purchase price of.
·
chairs sold; the agreement '!,'70Uld continue in force until terminated
by either party after ten (10) days written notice; Tazewell was to
furnish his own transportation, and the area to be served by him was
limited to six (6) counties in Virginia named in the contra.ct; and
all riahts of Tazewell under the aareement were nersonal and nonassign~ble.

~

On ..Tuly 21, 1975, while Taze,1ell was operating his own
automobile en route to the home of a nrospecti ve customer ·within his
area for the purnose of atte~nting to. make a sale~ Tazewell struck
and seriously injured Mary Maize, who promptlv thereafter commenced
an action against Tazewell and the Cornnany to recover damages for
personal injuries. In the course of the trial of the action. the·
contract between Tazewell and Therapeutic Massage Chair Company! Inc.
was introduced in evidence, and the followinq additional material
facts respecting the relationship between the Company and Tazewell
were Proved by plaintiff's evidence: Tazewell was en route to try
to effect a sale to a customer at the time his car struck and injured
JY1aize~ that he was driving his own car and was operating his car at
his own exnense; that the Company made no sugqestions as to how
Tazewell should perform his work and did not suggest any prospective
customer for him to see; that Tazewell was not required to make any
number of sales or work any particular time; that Tazewell used his
own judCJment and discretion as to when, where and how he would travel
to see a custo:P-1er, or whether he would work at all; and that Tazewell
had been usinq the automobile involved ln the accident for about a
year prior to.the accident with the knowledge of the Company. At the
conclusion of the evidence offered bv
counsel for the
.. the nlaintiff,
.
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Company moved to strike the evidence on the ground that the evidence
failed to establish an agency or master and servant relationship
between Therapeutic Massage Chair Company, Inc. and Tazewell.
How should the Court have ruled on the r.-totion?
6.
Linda Belle, while on her way to work, was involved in an
automobile accident. She was driving her husband 1 s car with his
knowledge and consent. Cathy Hart was the owner and operator of the
other automobile involved in the accident. Both automobiles were
greatly damaged. Cathy Hart sued Linda Belle in the General District
Court of Fauquier County, the county in which the accident occurred,
to recover damages to her auto~obile. Linda Belle appeared and filed
grounds of defense and a counterclaim to recover damages to the automobile of her husband. The General District Court, at the time of
trial, found that the driver of each car was guilty of negligence
which was a contributing cause of the collision and denied recovery
to both. The judgment of the General District Court was not appealed.
Thirty days after the trial in the General District Court, Linda
Belle commenced an action against Cathy Hart in the Circuit Court of
Fauquier County to recover damages in the amount of $50,000 for personal injuries that she allegedly sustained in the collision. .Cathy
Hart filed pleas of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
How should the Court rule on the pleas?
7.
Ralph Solicitor, an attorney Practicing law in Florida,
addressed a letter to James Barrister, an attorney practicing in
Richmond, Virginia. In that letter Solicitor advised that his client
had some claims against a Virginia resident living in Richmond that
would have to be asserted in a court of equity in Virginia, and he
requested Barrister to be associated with him in representing his
client. In the letter Solicitor also inauired of Barrister: (a) how
a suit in equity is com..menced in Virgini~; (b) if a defendant decides
to file a motion to quash process or a plea in abatement challenging
venue, is it necessary that this be done upon a special appearance:
(c) if a plea in abatement is filed and overruled, when must defendant answer the bill of complaint; and if a plea in abatement is not
filed, when must an answer be filed by the defendant~ (d) if defendant decides to file a cross-bill, within what time must it be filed;
and (e) if a cross-bill is filed by the defendant against the plaintiff, within what period of time must responsive pleadings be filed
by the plaintiff.

What response should Barrister make to the inquiries
directed by the letter?
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8. (a)William Good commenced a suit in equity in the Circuit
Court of Giles County, Virginia, against John Badmano A demurrer
filed by the defendant was overruled, after which an answer was filed
bv the defendant within the time required. Thereafter, the Court
heard evidence ore tenus on a prayer contained in the bill that Good
should be awarded temporary injunction. The temporary injunction was
denied by a decree of the Court. Thirty-one days after that decree
was entered, counsel for complainant learned of new and previously
unknown material evidence that he believed would persuade the Court
that the temporary injunction should be awarded.
What remedy, if any 2 is available to coMplainant,
and if there is a remedy, within what period of time
must complainant pursue the remedy?
(b)A final decree was later entered in the cause against the
defendant. Ninety days after the entry of that decree counsel for
defendant, in reviewing a transcript of the record in the case, concluded that there were errors of law apnarent on the face of the
record.
Under the facts statedr is there a remedy available
to defendant for the purpose of obtaining a correction of
the error by the trial court and, if so, state the
remedy. If there is a remedy available, may it be
pursued without leave of court?
9.

While on a visit to the City of Richmond in December of

1974, Ruth Meador, a widow of Washington, D.C., met and became at

once infatuated with Arthur Bell who was a resident of the City of
Petersburgv A few days later 9 Ruth accepted Arthur's offer of
marriage and1 after Arthur had obtained the needed license, the two
were married in the City of Richmond. Ruth had a young son John by
her first marriage, and she and John went to live with Arthur at his
home in Petersburg. In November of 1975 Ruth bore Arthur a child
they nameq Sarah.
In January of 1976 Ruth learned that Arthur had earlier been
married to Lois, that Lois was then living in North Carolina, and
that Arthur and Lois had never been divorced. She also learned from
the same informant that Arthur by illicit conduct had secretly become the father of a young girl named Gertrude, whose mother was a
person of loose character. Upon being given this information, Ruth
comes to see you, tells you the foregoing facts, and states she has
decided to seek an annulment of her marriage to Arthur. She then
asks you whetherv by proper court proceedings, Arthur can be required
to provide for the support and maintenance of (a) John, (b) Sarah,
and (c) Gertrude.
What should be your advice as to each of the children?
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10.
Grocery, Inc. operated a retail grocery store in the City
of Danville. Its President was Tom Hamilton and its Secretary and
Treasurer was Arthur Rust. The corporation's business was in a bad
condition, and its Board of Directors decided it would be to the advantage of the corporation were it to remodel the interior and the
display windows of the store. The Board authorized Hamilton, on
behalf of the corporation, to borrow $8,000 needed to effect such
remodelling. Hamilton went to Danville Bank to borrow the money,
but was told by the lending officer that the Bank would lend the
money only if one of the corporation's officers would endorse the
corporation's note. Rust told Hamilton he would act as an endorser
only if Hamilton would act as a co-endorser. Hamilton promised he
would do so. The next morning Hamilton presented to Rust a promissory note for $8,000 payable to the order of Danville Bank, which
note Hamilton had executed in the name of Grocery, Inc. as the
maker. The note recited it was to become due on October 15, 1975.
Rust thereupon signed the note as an endorser, and said to Hamilton
"Don't forget, you also are going to endorse this. 11 Hamilton replied "Don't worry, I will. 11 Shortly thereafter Hamilton presented the note to the Bank without himself having signed it as a
co-endorser, and received the Bank's cashier's check for $8,000·
payable to the order of Groc~ry, Inc.
Later the remodelling of the store of Grocery, Inc. was
completed through the use of the borrowed money; but the remodelling
did not improve the store's business, and on September 1, 1975 it
became insolvent. On October 15th, Danville !3ank demanded payment
of the note by Grocery, Inc., but payment was refused. On the next
day the Bank brought an action against Rust as the sole endorser of
the note to recover the $8,000, which Rust paid. Rust has now
brought an action against Hamilton to recover from him $4,000 as
contribution, and has alleged the foregoing facts in his motion for
judgment. Hamilton, as his only defense, filed a plea of the statute
of frauds.
How should the Court rule on Hamilton's plea?

